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From the earliest days of the republic, one of the central
responsibilities of the Attorney General of the United States has
been to advise officers of the executive branch on questions of
law.' In creating the office, the First Congress identified litigation
in the Supreme Court and the provision of legal advice as the
duties of the Attorney General: the last sentence of section 35 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 states that
there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned in the law,
to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be
sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose
duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme
Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give
his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by
the President of the United States, or when requested by the
t Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department
of Justice; Professor of Law (on leave), Duke University.
tt Professor of Law, Duke University (formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice).
The views expressed in this essay are the authors' (or Attorney General Edmund
Randolph's!) only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice
or of the Office of Legal Counsel. The authors would like to thank Dawn Johnsen, Neil
Kinkopf, Herman Marcuse, Dyone Mitchell, and Lawan Robinson.
1. By regulation, the Attorney General has delegated the responsibilities of prepar-
ing her formal legal opinions and of providing other forms of legal advice to the assis-
tant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (1993). Since
1977, the Office has also been responsible for publishing the Attorney General's formal
opinions as well as selected opinions of its own. See 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel at v
(1980). In a sense, therefore, this Article is the fulfillment of a long-deferred duty. Attor-
ney General Randolph's opinions will also be published in a forthcoming volume of the
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel.
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heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may
concern their departments, and shall receive such compensation
as shall by law be provided.2
The modern Attorney General is of course the head of a large
governmental department with functions that range far beyond the
office's original duties; however, the responsibilities of representing
the United States in the Supreme Court and of acting as counsel
to the executive branch remain of great importance to the office.
By rendering legal advice to the President and other executive
officers, the Attorney General plays an important role in the main-
tenance of the rule of law.4 This role is nowhere more significant
than when the Attorney General and the Department of Justice
provide advice on the meaning and application of the Constitu-
tion.5
2. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92. Since the creation of the De-
partment of Justice in 1870, Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162, the Attorney
General has also had the constitutional duty, as head of an "executive Department," to
provide an "Opinion, in writing" to the President "upon any Subject relating to the Du-
ties of [her] Office." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-513 (1988) (imposing duty to advise the President, heads of
executive departments, and in some circumstances the secretaries of the military de-
partments on questions of law); id. § 518 (requiring Attorney General and Solicitor Gen-
eral to "conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court" except where the
Attorney General decides otherwise).
4. See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal
Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, '15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993) (describing and sur-
veying the contemporary advice-giving role of the Office of Legal Counsel); John 0.
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General. A Normative, De-
scriptive, and Historical Prolegamenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375 (1993) (outlining mod-
els for analyzing the opinion-writing function of the Attorney General and addressing the
modern role of the Office of Legal Counsel); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power
of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 35 (discussing the role of the executive branch in
constitutional interpretation); Jeremy A. Rabkin, At the President's Side: The Role of the
White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 63 (1993) (discussing
the role of the White House Counsel in advising the President on legal issues, including
a comparison to the role played by the Attorney General); James M. Strine, The Office
of Legal Counsel: Legal Professionals in a Political System (1992) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Johns Hopkins University) (discussing the balancing of professional and polit-
ical values by the Office of Legal Counsel).
5. Indeed, the provision of the 1870 act that first permitted the Attorney General
to delegate the duty to provide legal advice did not permit the delegation of opinions
"involving a construction of the Constitution of the United States." Act of June 22, 1870,
ch. 150, § 4, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (1870).
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Although the published opinions of the Attorney General in-
clude a memorandum from August 1791,6 they do not include the
most important opinion of the first Attorney General, Edmund
Randolph. In February 1791, President George Washington asked
the views of Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton on the constitution-
ality of a bill to create a national bank that was then awaiting the
President's signature or veto. Randolph, who wrote first, actually
prepared two memoranda: one setting out his view of the proper
legal analysis of the bill's validity, and the other summarizing
other arguments that had been made but that he did not find co-
gent. His conclusion, that Congress lacked the power to grant a
corporate charter, was shared by Jefferson and rejected by Hamil-
ton.
Although Washington kept the bank bill opinions confidential,
the texts of Hamilton's and Jefferson's opinions eventually became
known and by the 1830s had become classic expressions of, respec-
tively, broad and narrow approaches to construing the powers of
Congress: they both have been reprinted many times. Randolph's
memoranda, written by someone without a political following or
an ideological legacy, have languished in apparent obscurity since
their appearance in print in 1832.8 This neglect has been a mis-
take. Randolph, far more than either Hamilton or Jefferson, made
a conscious attempt to distinguish his professional judgment about
the legal question of constitutionality from his political judgment
6. Interest on Certificates for 1791, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 2 (1791).
7. The constitutional views of the two secretaries may have been tinctured with
their extralegal policy views. Hamilton was the author of the bank bill. a central element
in his elaborate legislative agenda. Jefferson, in contrast, was heavily influenced by the
"Country" school of political thought that had emerged as the ideology of the political
opposition in eighteenth-century Britain. The Country writers identified the Bank of Eng-
land-the model on which Hamilton had consciously and clearly based the proposed
Bank of the United States-as one of the major tools by which "the Court" had corrupt-
ed British society and subverted traditional English liberty. See generally LANCE BAN-
NING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION (1978) (tracing the connections between Country
thought and Jeffersonian republicanism).
8. Matthew Clarke and David Hall published all the bank bill opinions in an exten-
sive collection of materials they compiled during the crisis over the rechartering of the
Bank of the United States. See MATTHEW ST. CLAIR CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, LEG-
ISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUD-
ING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 86-112 (1832). Clarke and Hall's version
of Randolph's opinions is generally accurate but diverges from the manuscripts at various
points.
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about the desirability of a national bank. The strengths and weak-
nesses of his opinions reveal much about the possibility-and the
difficulty-of constitutional interpretation as a form of specifically
legal (and not merely political) analysis. We therefore have edited
for publication Randolph's opinions, which are reprinted below in
Part III, as well as his cover letter, reprinted in Part II. Part I
outlines the historical background of the opinions and briefly com-
ments on Randolph's understanding and practice of constitutional
law.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Edmund Randolph had enjoyed a meteoric career up to the
time that President George Washington appointed him the first
Attorney General of the United States.' A member of one of the
most important families in the Virginia gentry, Randolph was vir-
tually the heir to high rank in the colonial legal establishment: his
grandfather, uncle, and father were all, in turn, the Crown's attor-
ney general for the colony.10 Although his father ultimately re-
solved conflicting loyalties by retiring to private life in England,
Randolph enthusiastically took the colonial side at the outbreak of
the Revolution, acting as an aide-de-camp to General George
Washington for a few months, before being elected, when not yet
twenty-three, to be a delegate to the 1776 convention that adopted
Virginia's first constitution and declaration of rights.
Over the next ten years, Randolph served as the state's first
attorney general, as a Virginia delegate to the Confederation Con-
gress, and as the governor of Virginia. His experiences played an
important role in shaping his later views on the United States
Constitution. In 1782, Randolph argued for the state in Common-
wealth v. Caton," a seminal judicial review case. Caton12 in-
volved the fate of three loyalists convicted of treason in the Vir-
ginia General Court and sentenced to death. The Virginia treason
statute provided that pardons for that crime could be granted only
9. For biographical details about Randolph, this Article relies primarily on JOHN J.
REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY (1974).
10. Professor Reardon remarks that by the mid-eighteenth century the legal profes-
sion "had come to be identified with [the Randolph] family." Id. at 4.
11. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
12. This account of the events surrounding the decision in Caton relies on DAVID J.
MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON 1721-1803, at 187-202 (1952).
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by "the general assembly,"'" and so the defendants had applied
to the legislature for mercy. The House of Delegates adopted a
pardon resolution but the Senate declined to agree. The defend-
ants' argument in the state courts was that the Delegates' resolu-
tion alone constituted a valid pardon because the treason statute's
apparent requirement of Senate concurrence was contrary to the
state constitution. t4 Arguing as attorney general that the pardon
resolution was ineffective, Randolph insisted that the treason stat-
ute "pursued the spirit of the constitution" and that "whether it
did or not, the court were not authorized to declare it void;"'" in
the end a majority of the Virginia Court of Appeals agreed with
him that the statute was valid and that consequently the pardon
resolution was without effect.16 Randolph's correspondence, how-
ever, strongly suggests that he personally disagreed with the argu-
ments his position required him to take. 7 Caton, which Randolph
repeatedly described as a "great constitutional question,"' 8 pre-
sented in sharp focus the issues of interpretive method and insti-
13. Act of Oct. 7, 1776, ch. 3, § 3, 9 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 168, 168
(1821).
14. The Virginia Constitution stated that the governor "shall, with the advice of the
council of state, have the power of granting reprieves or pardons, except where . . . the
law shall otherwise particularly direct; in which cases, no reprieve or pardon shall be
granted, but by resolve of the house of delegates." VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 6. The
treason statute was an apparent exercise of the power to create exceptions by law to the
executive's pardoning authority, but by providing for pardons in treason cases by "the
general assembly," the statute arguably violated a constitutional requirement that non-
executive pardons be issued by the House alone.
15. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 7.
16. After Caton was decided, both houses of the legislature passed a resolution
granting a conditional pardon to the defendants: one was required to enlist in the Amer-
ican army, and the other two were required to leave the state until the end of the war.
See MAYS, supra note 12, at 202.
17. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 262, 263 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal
eds., 1965) (stating Randolph's opinion that the appeals court's decision upholding the
statute was "prude[nt]" but "to any but lawyers the construction, by which the [constitu-
tion and statute] were reconcile[d,] would appear unintelligible" (third alteration in orig-
inal)); Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (July 18, 1782), in 4 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 422, 424 ("[The treason statute] interchanges with
the senate the peculiar rights of the other branch of the legislature."). Professor Reardon
concluded that Randolph probably thought that "the court should have ruled against the
commonwealth." REARDON, supra note 9, at 63.
18. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 2. 1782), if 5
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 17, at 230; Letter from Edmund Randolph
to James Madison (Oct. 26, 1782), in 5 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 17,
at 217.
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tutional responsibility that Randolph subsequently faced in advising
President Washington on the constitutionality of the bank bill.
Randolph's service in Congress in 1781-1782 forced him to
consider not only the meaning of constitutional restrictions on
legislative power, but also the specific constitutional issue of what
powers the national government could and should exercise,
Randolph was the draftsman of the 1781 ordinance by which the
Confederation Congress chartered the first national bank, the
Bank of North America, as well as the author of a committee
report to Congress arguing that such an institution was essential.19
Randolph was well aware of the difficulty of finding legal authori-
ty for the ordinance in the narrow powers granted Congress under
the Articles of Confederation, and he signed a subsequent letter to
the governor of Virginia in which the state's congressional delega-
tion explained that Congress's members had approved the ordi-
nance for differing reasons, "some of those, who voted in the affir-
mative thinkirig themselves obliged by the engagement in [M]ay
[when, prior to adoption of the ordinance, Congress had approved
a plan to raise subscriptions for Bank stock], others contending for
a constitutional power in these cases, and others assenting to it
from absolute necessity., 20
Randolph himself seems to have doubted the Confederation
Congress's power while believing that the need for a national bank
outweighed any constitutional scruples.21 The contrast between
national need and congressional authority that Randolph encoun-
tered in his time in Congress had a profound impact on his polit-
ical views. By the time he returned home, he had come to share
the view held by many young nationalists such as James Madison
and Alexander Hamilton that Congress was dangerously weak, and
that constitutional reform was necessary to strengthen national
authority.22
19. See REARDON, supra note 9, at 50-51.
20. Letter from Edmund Randolph, James Madison, and Joseph Jones to Benjamin
Harrison (Jan. 8, 1782), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 17, at 18, 19.
21. See REARDON, supra note 9, at 51. In his second 1791 bank bill opinion,
Randolph dismissed reliance on the Confederation Congress's action as precedent for the
bank bill in terms that support this supposition: "[T]he time of the [1781] incorporation
was so pressing, and the states had such an unlimited command over Congress and their
acts, that the public acquiescence ought not to be the basis of such a power under the
present circumstances." See infra p. 130.
22. "[L]ike so many who served in Congress, he returned to Virginia with a decided-
ly national outlook." REARDON, supra note 9, at 54.
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Randolph was a prominent actor in the framing and ratifica-
tion of the Constitution of 1787.' His nationalism led him to
play a key role in the Annapolis convention of 1786 that served as
a dry run for the Philadelphia convention. Randolph's activities at
and immediately after the Philadelphia convention, however, were
somewhat contradictory. Early in the framing convention he pre-
sented the remarkably nationalistic Virginia Plan, and he was a
vigorous critic later of the antinationalist counterproposal, the New
Jersey Plan.24 Randolph declined to sign the Constitution when it
was completed, however, and it was only in the Virginia state
convention that he openly endorsed ratification.' Randolph's
"fickle conduct" with respect to the Constitution earned him much
criticism,26 which reenforced Randolph's deep-seated dislike for
extreme political positions,27 but his ultimate-and perhaps deci-
sive--support for ratification in the critical Virginia convention
and his prominence among Virginia lawyers made him President
Washington's choice for Attorney General.
In his first year in office, Attorney General Randolph had
little to do. He was consulted on a few minor matters by executive
branch officers, and he was instructed by Congress to prepare a
report on the federal judicial system as organized by the 1789
Judiciary Act, an assignment he undertook with enthusiasm.
Randolph submitted his report, which suggested major changes in
the federal courts, in early 1791,29 but any interest in judicial re-
23. See id. at 79-86, 96-150.
24. See id. at 98-100, 104-05.
25. When accused of inconsistency, Randolph explained that circumstances had
changed since his initial hesitancy over the Constitution: "[T]he accession of eight States
reduced our [i.e., Virginia's] deliberations to the single question of Union or no Union."
10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1537,
1537 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION] (remarks of Randolph at the Virginia convention).
26. See Letter from John Brown Cutting to Thomas Jefferson (July 24, 1788), in 10
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 1707. Theodorick Bland, an anti-
Federalist delegate to the Virginia convention, remarked during the convention that Ran-
dolph "has at length taken his partie, and appears to be reprobated by the honest on
both sides-but is too precious a morsel to be spued out, altho. lukewarm." Letter from
Theoderick Bland to Arthur Lee (June 13, 1788), in 10 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 25, at 1617, 1618.
27. See REARDON, supra note 9, at 150.
28. See, e.g., Letter from Martin Oster to Comte de la Luzerne (June 28, 1788), in
10 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 1689, 1690 ("[Randolph]
spoke often and with Eloquence, and his Arguments contributed in no small way to the
favorable outcome.").
29. See the important study by Professor Wythe Holt, "Federal Courts as the Asylum
[Vol. 44:110
THE BANK BILL
form he might have sparked was submerged by the heady debates
over Hamilton's national bank bill. The bank bill provided for the
creation of a "private" banking corporation, the Bank of the Unit-
ed States, with close links to the federal government." The
Bank's stock would be sold by subscription under the supervision
of persons appointed by the President.3 Three-fourths of the pay-
ments for private subscriptions were to be made in public securi-
ties (thus raising the value of the securities instantaneously); the
United States, however, was to pay for its subscription (for up to
one-fifth of the Bank's capital stock) with a loan from the
Bank. The Bank's notes and bills of credit would be generally
negotiable and acceptable as payment for any debts due the feder-
al government, thereby rendering them a de facto circulating medi-
um.33 The Bank's directors would be elected by the stockholders
(including the United States) rather than appointed by the gov-
ernment, but their operations would be subject to close review by
the Secretary of the Treasury.34
The passage of the bank bill presented Washington, an ex-
tremely cautious man, with a dilemma." The establishment of a
national bank was a central element in Hamilton's legislative pro-
gram, and Washington shared Hamilton's desire for a strong na-
tional government. On the other hand, the bill's chief opponent in
Congress was Representative James Madison, a confidant of the
President, and Washington was unhappy about the necessity of
taking sides in what had become a highly charged political and
even partisan controversy. The ideological character of the debate
also made involvement in it unattractive to the President. Hamil-
ton and his supporters viewed a national bank as a key element in
the construction of a strong, commercially oriented republic. The
proposed Bank would stabilize the market value of the govern-
ment's securities and by doing so play a major role in restoring
to Federal Interests": Randolph's Report, The Benson Amendment, and the "Original Un-
derstanding" of the Federal Judiciary, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (1987).
30. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 1-3, 9-11, 1 Stat. 191, 191-92, 196.
31. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 191.
32. Id. §§ 2, 11, 1 Stat. 192, 196.
33. Id. § 7, para. XIII, 1 Stat. 192, 195; id. § 10, 1 Stat. 196.
34. Id. §§ 4, 7, para. XVI, 1 Stat. at 195.
35. For an account of Washington's involvement in the passage of the bank bill, see
JAMES T. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION (1783-1793), at
277-83 (1969).
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the public credit of the United States, which had evaporated under
the feckless Confederation. The Bank's activities in making loans
and issuing paper would create the private credit and the circulat-
ing medium that Hamilton and his supporters believed the specie-
starved United States required for a healthy market economy. The
Bank's overall effect, they believed, would be to facilitate govern-
mental operations and forge an unbreakable link between commer-
cial prosperity and the new federal government. The Bank's oppo-
nents, by contrast, saw it as a tool of an excessively Anglophile
monied aristocracy intent on profit at the expense of republican
and agrarian moral values. Madison added to the purely ideologi-
cal criticism of the Bank a legal dimension when he argued that
the bank bill did not rest on any power delegated to Congress by
the Constitution.36
Randolph agreed with Madison's constitutional conclusion, but
not with all of his analysis, 37 and from a modern perspective the
most interesting aspects of Randolph's memoranda are their gen-
eral comments on constitutional interpretation. Constitutional ques-
tions, he suggested, can be properly addressed only if one first
understands the nature of the constitution to be interpreted.
Where no written constitution exists, the "latitude of power" prop-
erly belonging to the government is "not always easy to be deter-
mined."38 Written constitutions (like those of the states) that es-
tablish a government but do not specify its powers produce a
similar indefiniteness in constitutional debate: the legislature "may
perhaps be presumed to be left at large as to all authority which
is communicable by the people, and does not affect any of those
paramount rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to con-
fide even to their representatives."39 The United States Constitu-
tion, in contrast, enumerates the powers of the federal govern-
ment, which therefore can exercise no authority not textually dele-
gated to it.40 When the essentially textual source of Congress's
36. The ideological and constitutional dimensions of the 1791 bank bill debate are
analyzed in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER 50-54 (1991); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Principles of '98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689,
699-700, 706-12, 722-25 (1994).
37. For a modern edition of Madison's main speech against the bank bill, see JAMES
MADISON, THE BANK BILL (1791), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 372
(Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981).
38. See infra p. 122.
39. See infra pp. 122-123.
40. See infra p. 123.
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authority is understood, Randolph insisted, it is clear that
Congress's legitimate powers cannot be based on general reasoning
about "the nature of the federal government" 41 or the needs of
the nation: "While, on the one hand, it ought not to be denied
that the federal government superintends the general welfare of
the states, it ought not to be forgotten, on the other, that it super-
intends it according to the dictates of the Constitution."'42
In outlining the "principle[s] of fair construction" 43 applicable
to the Constitution, Randolph steered a middle position between
advocates of narrow and broad construction of federal power. He
rejected the crabbed view of congressional authority Jefferson
expressed in his bank bill opinion44 as well as the expansive ap-
proach advocated by the supporters of the bank.45
The rule therefore for interpreting the specified powers seems to
be that, as each of them includes those details which properly
constitute the whole of the subject, to which the power relates,
the details themselves must be fixed by reasoning. And the ap-
41. See infra p. 122.
42. See infra p. 123. Randolph also rejected related arguments that "Congress may
exercise all authority to which the states are individually incompetent," see infra p. 123,
and that the general language of the Constitution's Preamble is an independent source of
federal power. See infra pp. 125.
43. See infra p. 123.
44. Jefferson reasoned that "[t]o take a single step beyond the boundaries thus spe-
cially drawn [by the Tenth Amendment] around the powers of Congress is to take pos-
session of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." THOMAS
JEFFERSON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL FOR ESTABLISHING A
NATIONAL BANK (1791), reprinted in POWELL, supra note 36, at 42. Therefore, Jefferson
thought, the Constitution should be read "to lace [Congress] up straitly within the enu-
merated powers, and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried
into effect." Id. at 43. Because the incorporation of a bank was not absolutely necessary
to the exercise of Congress's express powers, he concluded, it could not be viewed as an
implied power.
45. Hamilton, for example, wrote in his bank bill opinion of "the necessity & propri-
ety of exercising the authorities intrusted to a government on principles of liberal con-
struction." ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN AcT
TO ESTABLISH A BANK (1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
97, 105 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965). "If the end [of a statute] be clearly comprehended
within any of the specified powers, & if the measure have an obvious relation to that
end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the constitution-it may safely
be deemed to come within the compass of the national authority." Id. at 107. Because he
believed that there was "a natural & obvious relation between the institution of a bank,
and the objects of several of the enumerated powers of the government," id. at 120,
Hamilton argued that the bank bill was clearly constitutional.
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peal may, on this occasion be made to common sense and com-
mon language.46
The bank bill, Randolph thought, was too remote from "the sub-
ject" of any of Congress's enumerated powers to be justifiable on
the basis of the text of the Constitution. The basic fallacy in the
arguments supporting the bill's validity, therefore, was that they
emptied the specifications of power in Article I of any limiting
force: "[A] similar construction on every specified federal power,
will stretch ... into the whole circle of state legislation. 4 7 The
"discreet liberallity" with which constitutional powers are to be
construed, Randolph insisted, should not be employed so as to
undermine the very nature of Congress as a legislature with "par-
tial [rather] than general powers."4
Randolph's understanding of the scope of legitimate federal
authority was overtaken by history long ago-indeed, in a sense,
when President Washington decided to sign the bank bill into law
despite Randolph's concerns. 49  Randolph's concern for careful
and intellectually honest legal argument,50 however, remains of
perennial significance.5'
46. See infra p. 124.
47. See infra p. 126.
48. See infra pp. 123-124.
49. This occasion was thus the first-though not the last-time a President declined
to follow the legal advice of the Attorney General or the Office of Legal Counsel.
50. Randolph's unwillingness to endorse arguments supporting his conclusion that oth-
ers-but not he-found convincing is particularly striking. His second opinion addressed
more of the arguments of "the enemies of the bill" than those of its proponents, and he
was particularly careful to note the ways in which "the enemies" failed to address the
arguments that the bill's supporters actually made. See infra pp. 127-30.
51. Randolph's public career came to an unfortunate end, which may have discour-
aged interest in his constitutional views. When Jefferson resigned from the cabinet at the
end of 1793, Washington appointed Randolph his successor as Secretary of State, and for
some time Randolph was the President's closest adviser. In July 1795, however, the Brit-
ish minister turned over a captured French dispatch that suggested that Randolph had
disclosed confidential matters to the French minister. On the basis of the dispatch Rand-
olph's enemies in the cabinet accused him of treason and bribery, and unable to explain
matters to Washington's satisfaction, he resigned, protesting his innocence but in disgrace.
Modern scholars generally agree that Randolph's "relations with the French minister were
in no remote sense 'treasonable,' nor was he guilty of having solicited money for him-
self," but he had been at the least indiscreet, and his service in public office was over.
STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 426 (1993); see
also REARDON, supra note 9, at 307-34 (concluding that Randolph's actions were a well-
intentioned but unwise attempt to avoid a rupture in American relations with France).
Randolph did play one subsequent role of some significance in the history of the United
States Constitution, as one of the defense attorneys in the 1807 treason trial of Aaron
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II. RANDOLPH'S TRANSMITTAL LETrER52
[Attorney General Randolph enclosed a letter of transmittal
to President Washington with his opinions.]
Philadelphia
Feby 12th 1791
To
The President of the United States
Sir
I had arranged a couple of animadversions to be transmit-
ted to you, on the expediency of the Bank bill-but after the
recollection of the two conversations, which I have had the
honor of holding with you on this subject, I am uncertain
whether its expediency constitutes a part of your enquiry from
me. If it should be your pleasure, that I should enter into this
branch of the question, I can accomplish it on the notice of a
few hours.
The enclosed observations No. 1 go as far as I am able to
discover, to the substance of the dispute. They arise from an
examination of the Constitution itself.
There is indeed a minor class of arguments against the
bill, which I have received through the public prints & other
sources of communication. There is also an inferior order of
arguments in favor of the bill obtained thro' the same chan-
nels. Both descriptions are destitute of influence on my mind
but lest I may have depreciated them below their value, I
have resolved to state them to you in the paper No. 2.
I have the honor Sir, to be
with the greatest respect
your mo. obed. servt.
Signed, Edmd. Randolph
Burr. See id. at 357-58.
52. The following transcriptions reproduce as accurately as possible Randolph's hand-
written texts, which are preserved in the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress.
In accordance with modern historical editing standards, punctuation and capitalization
have been regularized. The layout attempts to replicate the appearance of the originals.
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III. THE OPINIONS
The Attorney General of the United States in obedience to
the order of the President of the United States, has had under
consideration the bill, entitled "An Act to incorporate the Sub-
scribers to the Bank of the United States," and reports on it, in
point of constitutionality, as follows:
It must be acknowledged that, if any part of the bill does
either encounter the Constitution or is not warranted by it, the
clause of incorporation is the only one.
The legal properties of this corporation would be:
1st. To have succession untill the 4th of March 1811;
2d. To purchase, receive, & retain, real and personal property
to an amount not exceeding fifteen millions of dollars, including
the capital stock;
3d. To sell & dispose of the property;
4. To sue & be sued;
5. To have a common seal; and
6. To make by-laws, and do all acts, appertaining to the
corporation, under certain restrictions prescribed in the act.
These properties, with different modifications in some instanc-
es, belong to all corporations: their importance strikes the eye.
That the power of creating corporations is not expressly given
to Congress, is obvious.
If it can be exercised by them, it must be;
1st. because the nature of the federal government implies it;
or
2d. because it is involved in some of the specified powers of
legislation; or
3. because it is necessary and proper to carry into executipn
some of the specified powers:
1. To be implied in the nature of the federal government
would beget a doctrine so indefinite, as to grasp every power.
Governments having no written constitution may perhaps claim
a latitude of power not always easy to be determined. Those
which have written constitutions are circumscribed by a just inter-
pretation of the words contained in them. Nay farther; a legisla-
ture, instituted even by a written constitution, but without a spe-
cial demarkation of powers, may perhaps be presumed to be left
at large as to all authority which is communicable by the people,
and does not affect any of those paramount rights, which a free
people cannot be supposed to confide even to their representa-
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tives. Essentially otherwise is the condition of a legislature whose
powers are described. An example of the former is in the state
legislatures; of the latter, in the legislature of the federal govern-
ment, the characteristic of which has been confessed by Congress,
in the twelfth amendment, to be, that it claims no powers which
are not delegated to it.
This last observation straitens the federal powers, and opposes
an opinion, not unpatronized, that Congress may exercise all au-
thority to which the states are individually incompetent.
If any subject of government, from which the states are not
excluded by the Constitution, be beyond their jurisdiction within
their own limits, let it be shewn: it cannot be easily conceived.
But what if a subject should really exist? Is the argument less
conclusive to say that the states must retain it, because it is not
given to the federal government, than that the latter, although lim-
ited in itself possesses it, because it is not within the verge of a
state constitution? While, on the one hand, it ought not to be
denied that the federal government superintends the general wel-
fare of the states, it ought not to be forgotten, on the other, that
it superintends it according to the dictates of the Constitution.
The opinion above alluded to can have only one other object,
namely, that every institution to which a single state can give effi-
cacy only within its own boundaries, devolves on Congress. But
the extravagance of such a position is manifested by a single cir-
cumstance, that the cutting of canals thro' two or more states, at
the will of Congress, is one of its least consequences.
2. We ask, then, in the second place, whether, upon any princi-
ple of fair construction, the specified powers of legislation involve
the power of granting charters of incorporation? We say charters
of incorporation, without confining the question to the Bank; be-
cause the admission of it in that instance is an admission of it in
every other, in which Congress may think the use of it equally
expedient.
There is a real difference between the rule of interpretation,
applied to a law & a constitution. The one comprises a summary
of matter, for the detail of which numberless laws will be neces-
sary; the other is the very detail. The one is therefore to be con-
strued with a discreet liberallity, the other with a closer adherence
to the literal meaning.
But when we compare the modes of construing a state
and the federal constitution, we are admonished to be stricter with
1994]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
regard to the latter, because there is a greater danger of error in
defining partial than general powers.
The rule therefore for interpreting the specified powers
seems to be that, as each of them includes those details which
properly constitute the whole of the subject, to which the power
relates, the details themselves must be fixed by reasoning. And the
appeal may, on this occasion be made to common sense and com-
mon language.
Those powers, then, which bear any analogy to that of
incorporation shall be examined separately in their constituent
parts; and afterwards in those traits which are urged to have the
strongest resemblance to the favorite power.
1. Congress have power to lay & collect taxes, &c. The
heads of this power are:
1. to ascertain the subject of taxation, &c.;
2. to declare the quantum of taxation &c.;
3. to prescribe the mode of collection; and
4. to ordain the manner of accounting for the taxes &c.
2dly. Congress have also power to borrow money on the cred-
it of the United States. The heads of this power are:
1. to stipulate a sum to be lent;
2. an interest, or no interest to be paid; and
3. "the time & manner of repayment, unless the loan
be placed on an irredeemable fund.
3. Congress have also power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes.
The heads of this power with respect to foreign nations are:
1. to prohibit them or their commodities from our ports;
2. to impose duties on them, where none existed before, or
to increase existing duties on them;
3. to subject them to any species of custom house regula-
tions; or
4. to grant them any exemptions or privileges which policy
may suggest.
The heads of this power with respect to the several states are
little more than to establish the forms of commercial intercourse
between them, & to keep the prohibitions which the Constitution
imposes on that intercourse undiminished in their operation; that
is, to prevent taxes on imports or exports; preferences to one port
over another by any regulation of commerce or revenue; and du-
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ties upon the entering or clearing of the vessels of one state in the
ports of another.
The heads of this power with respect to the Indian tribes are:
1. to prohibit the Indians from coming into, or trading with-
in, the United States;
2. to admit them with or without restrictions;
3. to prohibit citizens of the United States from trading with
them; or
4. to permit with or without restrictions.
4. Congress have also power to dispose of & make all need-
ful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States. The heads of this power are:
1. to exert an ownership over the territory of the United
States, which may be properly called the property of the United
States, as is the Western Territory; and to institute a government
therein; or
2. to exert an ownership over the other property of the
United States.
This property may signify:
1. Personal property of the United States, howsoever ac-
quired; or
2. real property, not aptly denominated territory, acquired
by cession or otherwise.
It cannot signify:
1. Debts due from the United States;
2. Nor money arising from the sources of revenue pointed
out in the Constitution. The disposal and regulation of money is
the final cause for raising it by taxes &c.
5. The Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on
as a source of power.
To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Pream-
ble if it be operative is a full constitution of itself, and the body
of the Constitution is useless; but that it is declarative only of the
views of the convention, which they supposed would be best ful-
filled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate
nature of preambles.
With this analysis of the foregoing specified powers, compare
each of the corporate powers and where is the similitude? It lies,
say the advocates of the bill, in the power to lay & collect taxes,
&c.; because it facilitates the payment of them: in that of borrow-
ing money; because it creates an ability to lend; in that of regulat-
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ing commerce, because it increases the medium of circulation, and
thus encourages activity & industry. In 'that of disposing and regu-
lating property; because the contributions, and the interest of the
United States in the Bank, are property of the United States. Of
each of these reasons, something will be said in their order.
The incorporation of a bank can facilitate the payment of
taxes, only by creating a faculty to pay, or by supplying a deficient
medium, or by rendering the transportation of money to the seat
of government more convenient. But to lay and collect taxes is, in
fact, to demand & receive a public debt, resting the mode of pro-
curing the money on the resources of the debtors; and, as to its
transportation, surely there are many other vehicles besides bank
bills.
To borrow money presupposes the accumulation of a fund to
be lent; and is secondary to the creation of an ability to lend.
By regulating commerce, in order to increase the medium of
circulation, cannot be intended any of the commercial powers
designated above; these being very remote from the incorporation
of a bank. Nor can it be imagined that it is intended to reach the
emission of paper money. What construction remains, by which to
regulate commerce, can increase the medium? Only the emission
of coin, which is licensed in terms by another clause.
To dispose of or to regulate property, even bank stock itself,
is utterly distinct from the incorporation of a bank: for the con-
tributions on which the bank stock arises, go upon the principle
that a bank already exists; how else can contributions be made to
it?
But, in truth, the serious alarm is in the concentered
force of these sentiments. If the laying and collecting of taxes
brings with it every thing which, in the opinion of Congress, may
facilitate the payment of taxes; if to borrow money sets political
speculation loose, to conceive what may create an ability to lend;
if to regulate commerce is to range in the boundless mazes of
projects for the apparently best scheme to invite from abroad, or
to diffuse at home, the precious metals; if to dispose of or to
regulate property of the United States, is to incorporate a bank,
that stock may be subscribed to it by them, it may without exag-
geration be affirmed that a similar construction on every specified
federal power, will stretch the arm of Congress into the whole
circle of state legislation.
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The general qualities of the federal government, independent
of the Constitution and the specified powers, being thus insuffi-
cient to uphold the incorporation of a bank, we come to the last
enquiry, which has been already anticipated, whether it be sancti-
fied by the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Con-
stitution. To be necessary is to be incidental, or in other words
may be denominated the natural means of executing a power.
The phrase, "and proper," if it has any meaning, does not
enlarge the powers of Congress, but rather restricts them. For no
power is to be assumed under the general clause, but such as is
not only necessary but proper, or perhaps expedient also. But as
the friends to the bill ought not to claim any advantage from this
clause, so ought not the enemies to it, to quote the clause as hav-
ing a restrictive effect: both ought to consider it as among the
surplusage which as often proceeds from inattention as caution.
However, let it be propounded as an eternal question to those
who build new powers on this clause, whether the latitude of con-
struction which they arrogate will not terminate in an unlimited
power in Congress?
In every aspect therefore under which the attorney general
can view the act, so far as it incorporates the Bank, he is bound
to declare his opinion to be against its constitutionality.
Signed, Edmd. Randolph
February 12th, 1791
No. 2.
The Attorney General, holding it to be his duty to address to
the President of the United States, as the grounds of an official
opinion, no arguments the truth of which he does not acknowl-
edge, has reserved for this paper several topics, which have more
or less influenced the friends & enemies of the Bank bill; and
which ought therefore to be communicated to the President.
1. The enemies of the bill have contended that a rule of con-
struction, adverse to the power of incorporation, springs out of the
Constitution itself; that after the grant of certain powers to Con-
gress, the Constitution, as if cautious against usurpation, specially
grants several other powers, more akin to those before given, than
the incorporation of a bank is to any of those from which it is
1994]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
deduced. This position, they say, has been exemplified in four
instances:
1. A power is given to regulate commerce; and yet is added
a power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States; to fix the standard of weights and
measures; and to establish post offices and post roads.
2. A power is given to coin money; and yet is added a pow-
er to regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin; and to pro-
vide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin of the
United States.
3. A power is given to declare war; & yet is added a power
to grant letters of marque and reprisal; to make rules concerning
captures on land & water; to raise & support armies; to provide &
maintain a navy; and to make rules for the government & regula-
tion of the land & naval forces.
4. A power is given to provide for calling forth the militia,
to execute the laws of the Union; and yet is added a power to call
them forth to suppress insurrections.
Whosoever will attentively inspect the Constitution will readily
perceive the force of what is expressed in the letter of the conven-
tion, "That the Constitution was the result of a spirit of amity and
mutual deference & concession." To argue, then, from its style or
arrangement, as being logically exact, is perhaps a scheme of rea-
soning not absolutely precise.
But if the Constitution were ever so perfect, considered even
as a composition, the difficulties which the above doctrine has
started may be solved by the following remarks.
These similar powers, on which stress is laid, are either inci-
dental or substantive, that is, independent powers.
If they be incidental powers, and the conclusion be that, be-
cause some incidental powers are expressed, no others are admissi-
ble, it would not only be contrary to the common forms of con-
struction, but would reduce the present Congress to the feebleness
of the old one, which could exercise no powers not expressly dele-
gated. So that the advocates for the power of incorporation, on
the principle of incidentality to some specified power, would, not-
withstanding this supposed rule of interpretation, be as much at
liberty to insist on its being an incidental power as ever.
If these similar powers be substantive and independant (as on
many occasions they are, that is, as they can be conceived to be
capable of being used, independently of what is called the princi-
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pal power) it ought not to be inferred that they were inserted for
any other purpose than to bestow an independent power, where it
would not otherwise have existed.
The only remaining signification which the doctrine now con-
troverted can have is that the incorporation of a bank, being more
wide from a connection with the specified powers of legislation
than the additional ones were from the principal powers to which
they were supposed to belong, the power of incorporation being
omitted, or rather not specially mentioned, cannot be assumed.
Even this answer is not adequate to those who derive the power
of incorporation from the nature of the federal government.
Hence the rule contended for by the enemies of the bill is
defective every way. It would be still more so with respect to
those (if any such there be) who construe the words, "necessary
and proper," so as to embrace every expedient power.
2. An appeal has been also made by the enemies of the bill
to what passed in the federal convention on this subject. But
ought not the Constitution to be decided on by the import of its
own expressions? What may not be the consequence if an almost
unknown history should govern the construction?
3. The opinions too of several respectable characters have
been cited, as delivered in the state conventions. As these have no
authoritative influence, so ought it to be remembered that observa-
tions were uttered by the advocates of the Constitution, before its
adoption, to which they will not and, in many cases, ought not to
adhere.
4. On the other hand, the friends to the bill have relied on
the congressional acts as to West Point, the government of the
Western Territory, and the power of removal from office given to
the President.
The two first are within express powers, as will occur, by
adverting to the power to exercise authority over places purchased
for forts &c. and to the power to dispose of and make needful
rules and regulations respecting the property of the Und. States.
The last is a point with a great weight of reason on each side. If it
be founded on the general nature of executive authority, the pow-
er is probably not tenable, without resorting to the doctrines of
the friends to the bill. But it appears to be a power not specially
given to any person (except on an impeachment) and may there-
fore incidentally belong to Congress to confer on the President:
however, if this step be an error, it is never too late to correct it.
1994]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
5. It has been also pretended, that even the infirm old Con-
gress incorporated a bank; and can a less power be presumed to
be vested in the federal government which has been formed to
remedy their weakness? This argument is so indefinite, the time of
the incorporation was so pressing, and the states had such an un-
limited command over Congress and their acts, that the public
acquiescence ought not to be the basis of such a power under the
present circumstances.
6. Congress, it is farther said, may provide for the general
welfare, and this includes the power of incorporation: but they are
to provide for the general welfare in laying & collecting taxes. Is
the incorporation of a bank a tax bill? The meaning of the power,
taken together, seems to be that Congress may lay taxes for the
purpose of expending money for the public welfare, even to sub-
scribe it to a bank. But is this like the creation of [a] bank? It im-
plies that a bank has been already created.
7. It has been also asserted that Congress have an exclusive
legislation at the seat of government. This will not be true until
they go to the place of the permanent residence.
The attorney general has not collected any other informa-
tion upon this subject, altho' more may perhaps have been said by
the partizans for & against the Bank than is here noticed.
Signed, Edm. Randolph
Feby. 12th, 1791
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APPENDIX: THE BANK BILL-A MODERN OPINION
If the Office of Legal Counsel were asked today to advise the
President as to constitutional issues raised by the bank bill, it
would address a quite different set of concerns from those raised
by Attorney General Randolph. Congress's constitutional authority
to charter a national bank is, of course, a matter of settled and
venerable precedent. 3 What was for Randolph and his contempo-
raries a difficult and hotly contested constitutional issue would
present no difficulties today.
A modem Office of Legal Counsel opinion on the bank bill
would, on the other hand, likely identify and address a variety of
issues arising from the Appointments Clause" and the principle
of separation of powers." The Appointments Clause, which limits
the procedures by which "Officers of the United States" may be
appointed, would apply to the Bank only if the Bank were a gov-
ernment entity. To say the least, the Bank had close links with the
federal government. 6 In addition to these links, the states were
prohibited from taxing the Bank. 7 Given these factors, the Bank
arguably would have been a government entity.5" To conclude
that the Appointments Clause was implicated by the bank bill, it
would also be necessary to decide that the Bank's directors exer-
cise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States."5 9 A vigorous reading of the Bank's authority might lead
one to conclude that its directors were to wield such authority.
53. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Even if Congress's au-
thority were not so settled, however, the bank bill clearly would be valid under the mod-
em understanding of the Borrowing Clause, U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 2, and the com-
merce and spending powers, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 3. See New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992) (discussing the "[Supreme] Court's broad construction
of Congress' power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses"); Hudspeth v. Melville,
127 F.2d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1941) (interpreting the Borrowing Clause).
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
55. It is illuminating that neither of these concerns was even mentioned by Attorney
General Randolph.
56. Cf. First Agric. Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 355 (1968) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (noting that second national bank "clearly acted as the fiscal agent of
the Government").
57. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
58. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558-59 (1963) (holding
national banks to be "quasipublic institutions" subject to congressional control).
59. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1975).
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Under such a reading, the bill would be subject to at least two
Appointments Clause objections.
The first objection would be that the bank's officers, its direc-
tors, were to be appointed by the shareholders.' ° The Appoint-
ments Clause vests the power to appoint "Officers of the United
States" in the President, by and with advice and consent of the
Senate, or (for "inferior Officers" when Congress so directs) in the
President, the courts, or the heads of departments.6 Since the
Bank's officers were not to be appointed in any of these ways, the
Bank's structure would have been unconstitutional if it were con-
sidered a government entity. To render the bank bill constitution-
al, then, the provisions for the selection of the Bank's directors
would have had to be changed to conform to the Appointments
Clause.
The second Appointments Clause concern that might be raised
concerns the bill's provision restricting eligibility to serve as a
director to stockholders who are citizens of the United States.62
Relying on a broad reading of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,63 the Office
of Legal Counsel has argued in the recent past that it is "imper-
missible" for Congress to impose "qualifications requirements on
principal officers."' However, the controlling caselaw seems to
hold that Congress may impose reasonable and relevant qualifica-
tion requirements as part of its power to establish offices.65 While
there may be some officers who by nature of their duties are so
close to the President as to admit of no reasonable or relevant
qualification requirement, the Bank's directors clearly could not be
so described, and in light of 1791 fears about foreign financial
control of United States institutions, the citizenship requirement
for directors seems reasonable.
On the separation of powers front, some might also find con-
stitutionally objectionable the provision of section 9 establishing a
60. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 4, 1 Stat. 191, 192.
61. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
62. § 7, 1 Stat. at 193.
63. 491 U.S. 440, 482-89 (1989).
64. Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Constitutional Authori-
ty, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 299, 301 (1989) (preliminary print).
65. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926) ("To Congress under
its legislative power is given the establishment of offices, the determination of their func-
tions and jurisdiction, the prescribing of reasonable and relevant qualifications and rules
of eligibility of appointees.").
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bounty for anyone who informs of a violation of its substantive
proscriptions.66 It is similar to the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act67 that have been said to be unconstitutional because,
inter alia, they deputize private individuals not subject to the con-
trol of the executive branch to litigate on behalf of the United
States. Such fragmentation of executive power, it has been argued,
impermissibly undermines the President's ability to enforce the
laws of the United States and thus violates the Take Care Clause
and the principle of separation of powers.68 This argument, how-
ever, has never been the official position of the Department of
Justice, and we find persuasive the conclusion of recent circuit
court decisions that the False Claims Act is valid.69
66. § 9, 1 Stat. at 196.
67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988).
68. See Memorandum to Attorney General Dick Thornburgh from Assistant Attorney
General William Barr re: Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims
Act, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 249, 273-76 (1989) (preliminary print).
69. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 757 (9th Cir.
1993). Section 9 of the bank bill, which gave no actual litigation authority to private
persons, is even more clearly constitutional. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 9, 1 Stat. 191,
196.
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